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The number of requests for patent examination showed a significant increase of 83% from 
1997 to 2007 in Japan, while the number of patent applications increased by only 1%.   
This paper aims at theoretically and empirically analyzing the causes of recent “explosion” 
of examination  requests, focusing especially on (1) the introduction of  multiple  claim 
system (January 1, 1988), (2) the shortening of the period available for examination re-
quest from seven to three years (October 1, 2001) and (3) the revisions of examination 
request fee and annual fee (April 1, 2004). We test the following propositions which are 
derived from the theoretical model; (a) the increase in the average number of claims in-
creases  the  value  of  applications  and  raises  the  rate  of  examination  request;  (b)  the 
shorter period of examination request increases the probability that the low-quality ap-
plications are requested for examination; and (c) the reforms of examination request fee 
and  renewal  fee improve the  average quality of applications which are requested for 
examination. Our empirical results support these propositions. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
Under the Japanese patent system, an applicant (or a third party) has to request for the 
examination within three years from the date of application if it pursues to patent its 
invention (or if a third party wants to clarify the patentability)1. That is, the Japan Pa-
tent Office (JPO) examines the applications only after the firms’ requests for examination. 
This examination request system gives the firm the time to sort out the inventions which 
deserve patent protection. The aim of this system is to save the cost of patent examina-
tion and to decrease the stocks of unnecessary patent grants which can constrain the ri-
val firms’ innovative activities. Thereby, the public knowledge pool is enlarged by saving 
the social cost of examination without loss of applicants’ benefit. 
In Japan, the patent examination request system was introduced in 1971. Until the 
end of September in 2001, the allowable period of request for examination had been seven 
years. This period was reduced to three years in October 2001. We expect this revision to 
reduce the stocks of unexamined applications which can block rival firms’ production and 
R&D behaviors. The low-quality patent applications, when they are left unexamined, can 
hinder the emergence of new valuable inventions. The shortening of the period of ex-
amination request decreases this negative effect on social welfare. However, it also has an 
adverse effect of increasing the number of low-quality applications for which examina-
tions are requested since it makes firms difficult to assess the real quality of their inven-
tions. Some of these patent applications would be granted patents, constraining the third 
party. 
This effect can be offset by the modifications of fee structure in April 2004. The JPO 
raised the examination request fee and decreased the annual fee. In this revisions, the 
total fee for the patents with relatively lower quality rises, whereas for the relatively 
high-quality patents it  decreases. This improves the  social welfare by decreasing the 
examination  requests  for  the  low-quality  applications  and  increasing  the  share  of 
high-quality patents. Therefore, these two recent reforms of patent examination request 
system in Japan can be regarded as complementary policy means. 
There are few researches who directly address the issue of an examination request, 
except for Palangkaraya et al. (2008). Palangkaraya et al. (2008) shows that the grant 
rate is negatively correlated with the timing of examination request. According to their 
view, this provides the evidence that the applicants use their private knowledge about the 
quality of their inventions to distort the rival firms’ R&D activities by delaying the timing 
of  examination  request.  Regibeau  and  Rockett  (2003)  theoretically  analyses  the  rela-
tionship between the examination duration and the importance of patents. They argue 
that shorter duration of patent examination improves the social welfare as long as the 
incentive of firms  to  develop  high-quality inventions  is assured. Shorter examination 
duration lowers the accuracy of examination and increases the social welfare. This is 
because social welfare is improved when Patent Office mistakenly refuses high-quality 
inventions to grant patents. 
This paper, differently from these studies, focuses on the impact of recent policy re-
forms in Japan on firms’  examination request  behaviors.  The number of requests for 
examination showed a significant increase of 83% from 1997 to 2007 in Japan, while the 
number of patent applications increased only by 1%. This paper aims theoretically and 
empirically to analyze the causes of the recent explosion of examination requests, focus-
ing especially on (1) the introduction of multiple claim system, (2) the shortening of the 
                                                   
1  The patent examination request by third party is very limited. In the rest of the paper we ignore this 
channel of patent examination.   3 
request period available for examination from seven to three years (October 1, 2001) and 
(3) the revisions of examination request fee and annual fee (April 1, 2004). The following 
propositions are derived from the theoretical model. 
(Ⅰ) The increase in the value of patents, which can be measured by the number of claims, 
raises the rate of examination request.   
(Ⅱ) If the examination request period is shortened, the average quality of the applica-
tions  for  which  examinations  are  requested  becomes  lower  since  the  uncertainty  in-
creases. This raises the rate of examination request. 
(Ⅲ) The increase in the examination request fee makes firms screen out the low-quality 
applications, and the decrease in the annual fee is more advantageous for the long-life 
patents with high quality. 
The following our empirical findings are consistent with these propositions. 
(i) Firms which file the application for a patent with large number of claims or which 
increase the number of claims over time show higher rates of examination requests. 
(ii) The shortening of the period of examination request results in a sharp rise in the 
examination request rate. This policy change has a large effect especially on the firms 
facing high uncertainty. 
(iii) The revisions of the fee structure increased the average quality of applications which 
are requested for examination. This is because the reforms are cost reducing for the firms 
having high-quality applications,  whereas  they are  fare hike for the  firm  which files 
low-quality applications.   
The shortening of the examination request period is expected to prevent firms from 
leaving applications with little patentability unexamined. We find, however, that this 
change has the effect of increasing the examination requests of low-quality inventions 
and decreasing the social welfare because of the increase in the uncertainty. On the other 
hand, the reforms of fee structure which decrease the expected total fee for high-quality 
patents and increase for low-quality ones ofsetts at least partially the negative effects on 
social welfare caused by the shortening the allowable period. We can, therefore, say that 
these system reforms are complementary to each other. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a model which 
can explain the relationship between firms’ examination request behaviors and the policy 
reforms.  Section  3  empirically  analyze  the  impact  of  reforms  of  examinaiton  request 
system. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.    A theoretical Model 
 
2.1 Outline 
Some patent applications do not need an immediate exclusive right because of the un-
certainty of its timing of commercialization. One of the purposes of examination request 
system is giving firms a certain period to sort the useful inventions. This system saves 
the  resources  related  to  examination  and  expands  the  public  knowledge  anyone  can 
access, without losing the applicants’ benefit. Firms can effectively protect their technol-
ogy by the patent registration. They, however, have to pay the annual fee to keep a patent 
in force. Therefore, it is rationale for firms to postpone a decision-making of examination 
requests if they do not have a prospect of using the inventions in near future. Considering 
these cost and benefit of a patent, firms decide which and when to request for examina-
tion of their applications. 
This type of decision-making is analogous to the firms’ investment problem under the   4 
uncertainty.  It  has  considerably  different  characteristics  from  the  decision-making  of 
patent applications closely related to the competition with rival firms. 
Under the examination request system, the applicants have the right to request for 
examination anytime they want within the allowable period. That is, the examination 
request system gives the applicants an option value for their applications. By delaying 
the examination request, the applicants can gain time to evaluate the inventions at the 
expense of opportunity cost of patent. In other words, the merit of delaying a decision for 
firms is that they can acquire additional information and decrease the uncertainty, whe-
reas the demerit is that the periods of patent protection are shortened. In this section, we 
model this tradeoff and analyze the impact of shortening period of examination request 
and the amendments of fee schedule on firms’ incentive to request for examination. 
There are some useful studies which address the decision-making of patent renewals, 
though few researches directly analyze the examination request system. The problems of 
examination request and patent renewal have common nature that both are the deci-
sion-making under the uncertainty where the  value of patents/applications gradually 
becomes clear as time passes. Pakes (1986) is a pioneer work which provides the theo-
retical model of patent renewal. He, furthermore, simulates the option value of patens by 
using the historical data of patent renewals in three Patent Offices (France, Germany 
and United Kingdom). Using the Pakes’s approach, Deng (2006) analyzes the changes in 
the value of patents after the establishment of the EPO2. 
The models developed in these previous studies are based on real option theory3. The 
strength of real option theory is that it can analyze the flexibility of decision -making. 
That is, it is well suited for the analysis of the problems such as the postponement or the 
abandonment of investment corresponding to the given situation at eac h stage4. In the 
next subsection, we  develop a simple model to analyze the firms’ examination request 
behavior using the comparative statics based on the idea of real option approach. 
 
2.2 Framework 
First, we divide the allowable period of examination request into two periods (? = 1,2). 
Therefore, each period means 3.5 years if examination request period is 7 years, and 1.5 
years if maximum request period is 3 years. The decision making of a firm in period  ?  is 
described as follows. At the beginning of period  ?, the firms decide whether they request 
for examination of their application or not. In this stage, their decision is based on the 
subjective value of the application  ?,  ??,?, without knowing the true value  ?  ?
5. The true 
value of the application  ?, ?  ?, is log-normally distributed, and its mean is  𝜇  and variance 
is  𝜎2. Thus we can write as log(?  ?)～N(𝜇,𝜎2). Each firm experimentally knows the aver-
age value of the real quality of applications,  𝜇, whereas they do not know the distribution 
of the true value. That is, each firm behaves based on the distribution of their own ex-
pectations about the quality6. Delaying the decision, the firms can acquire the additional 
information about the availability of their application. This approximates firms’ expected 
value of the application to the true value. This relation can be formulated as below.   
                                                   
2  There are other studies, such as Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), which theoretically analyze the patent 
renewals system. 
3  Pitkethly (1999) reviews the approaches to assess the patent value focusing on the option theory.  
4  Hubbard (1994) and Weeds (2002) analyze the rationality of delaying the investment by using the real op-
tion theory.  
5  The variable  ??,?  includes the probability of being granted. 
6 The distribution of firm  ?’s expectation about the value of an application in period   ?  is common in all firms.   5 
In the beginning of the second period, nature send firms a signal to fill the gap be-
tween the expected value and the true value of the application so that firms can revise 
their expectation. We write this signal in each period  ?  as (?  ? − ??,?−1 + ??,?), where  ??,?  is 
a noise which is uniformly distributed over  [−?,?]  with  E[??,?] =  0.  Using the signal 
(?  ? − ??,?−1 + ??,?), firms estimate the amount of revision of their expectation, since firms 
can  not  directly  observe  the  correct  revised  amount  (?  ? − ??,?−1).  The  estimator  ??,?  is 
given by 
 
  ??,? = ?(?  ? − ??,?−1 + ??,?)   ,            (1) 
 
where  ?  is a common parameter to all firms. We can derive  ?  as the ratio of the va-
riance of true signal  (?  ? − ??,?−1)  to that of noise, that is,  ? = 1/{1 + ???(??,?)/???(?  ? −
??,?−1)}. Equation (1) expresses the situation such that firms observe the trend of tech-
nology and market so that they can assess more precisely the value of their application. 
The firms’ expected value of the application in period  ?  is written as following equa-
tion. 
 
  ??,? = ??,?−1 + ??,?   (? ≥ 1) .            (2.1) 
 
In the initial point where firms have no information (? = 0), they expect that their appli-
cation has an average quality (??,0 = 𝜇)7. Thus, we can rewrite equation (2.1) in terms of 𝜇 
and  ?  ?; 
 
  ??,? =    1 − ? ?−1 ?
?=1 ? ?  ? + ??,?  + (1 − ?)?𝜇  .        (2.2) 
 
This equation shows that firms’ expectation get closer to the true value as time passes, 
and we can obtain  ?[????→∞ ??,?] = ?  ?. 
Each firm requests for examination only if the expected value is larger than the crit-
ical level at which examination request is profitable. The distribution of the true value of 
applications, which has log-normality, is ex-ante unobservable for firms. 
Let C , ??  and  ?(??,?)  denote the examination request fee, discount factor in period t, 
and the expected present value of subsequent rent flow from the examination request in 
period t, respectively. The discounted option value of the application in period t is given 
by 
 
       𝑉 ?,??,?  = ???{???(??,?) − ?, ??𝑉(? + 1,??,?+1)}  .        (3) 
 
Equation (3) means that the discounted present value of holding the right of examination 
request is either the expected profit of requesting examination in period  t or the dis-
counted present value of the right in the next period  ? + 1  with delaying the decision. We 
can consider  ?(??,?) as the subjective present value of an application after the examina-
tion request. The variable  ?(??,?)   is assumed to be taken all factors into account, such as 
grant rate, renewal term and renewal fee8.   
                                                   
7  When we take the expectation of  ε?  in terms of  ?  and ?, we get  ??,? ??  = ? ??,? − ??,?−1  = 0. This means the 
ex-ante average deviation of firms’ expectation from the true value is zero. 
8  We assume that firms cannot get revenue if their application is not granted. Therefore, we eliminate the 
application-only benefit such as blocking and signaling.   6 
When the quality of invention is high the grant rate would be high, and the total cost 
of annual fee becomes large since the renewal term would be long. For the simplicity, we 
assume  ?  as following. 
 
  ?(??,? ,?) = (? − ??)??,?  ,              (4) 
 
where  ?  is annual fee, and both  ?  and  ?  are positive constant numbers. Additionally 




Now, let us derive the solution of the model under the settings above. Each firm requests 
for examination only if the expected profit of examination request is equal to or larger 
than the one of not requesting. We can write the firm   ?’s decision-making problem in 
period  ?  as following equation, where  𝑋?,? = 1  means the firm  ?  requests for examina-
tion and  𝑋?,? = 0  means the firm does not request for it. 
 
  𝑋?,? =    1      ??     ?? ?(??,? ,?) − ? ≥ ?? 𝑉(? + 1,??,?+1 )
0      ??ℎ??????                                                         
   .      (5) 
 
Note that the option value of holding the examination request right becomes  0  after the 
allowable  request  period  expires(? > ?).  Thus,  in  our  two-period  model,  the  deci-
sion-makings of firm  ?  in each period  ?  is given by 
 
  𝑋?,2 =    1      ??     ?2 ?(??,2 ,?) − ? ≥ 0
  0      ??ℎ??????                            
   ,          (6) 
 
  𝑋?,1 =    1      ??     ?1 ?(??,1 ,?) − ? ≥ ?1 𝑉(2,??,2 )
  0      ??ℎ??????                                                 
   .        (7) 
 
In period 2, the firm’s revision of the expectation follows  ??,2 = ??,1  + ?(?  ? − ??,1)  on av-
erage. Using this expression and equation (6), we can derive the critical level of real 
quality  in  period  2,  denoted  by ?2.  The  application ?  with  ?  ? ≥ ?2  is  requested  for  ex-
amination. That is, we can find  ?2  which satisfies the following equation. 
 
  ?2 (? − ??){𝜇 + ?(2 − ?)(?2 − 𝜇)} − ? = 0                 (8) 
 
In order to derive the critical level of  ?  ?  in period 1,  ?1, we have to calculate the following 
equation (9). 
 
  ?1 ?(??,1 ,?) − ? = ?1𝑃?[𝑋?,2 = 1] ?[?2?(??,2,?) − ? | 𝑋2 = 1]        (9) 
 
The right hand side of (9) is the present value of the expected profit of postponing a deci-
sion from period 1 to period 2.  𝑃?[𝑋2 = 1]  (= 𝑃?[?2?(?2,?) ≥ ?]) is the probability of ex-
amination  request  in  period  2. ?[?2?(??,2,?) − ? | 𝑋2 = 1]  is  a  firm’s  expected  profit  of 
requesting for examination in period 2. In our model, firms are assumed to get nothing if 
they do not request for examination (?[?2?(??,2,?) | 𝑋2 = 0] = 0). 
Restricting the range of parameters to hold the condition  𝑃?[𝑋2 = 1] ∈ [0,1], we can   7 
derive the critical level in period 1,  ?1, from the following equation9. 
 
  ?1 (? − ??){??1 + (1 − ?)𝜇}− ? −
?1?2
4?2 (?−??)?? = 0       (10) 
 
where  ? = ?2 (? − ??){?(2 − ?)?1 + (1 − m)2𝜇 + ??} − ?. 
Let us now analyze the impact of the changes in exogenous variables on these critical 
levels,  ?1  and  ?2, and thereby, on the examination request profile. 
 
2.4 Comparative Statics 
Denoting the distribution function of the true values of the applications by ?(q  ), we 
can write the rate of request for examination in the first period (?1), the rate of that in the 
second period (?2) and the eventual rate of examination request (?) as following expres-
sions respectively (see Figure 1). 
We focus on the realistic case in which the condition  ?2 < 𝜇 < ?1  holds. If the lowest 
quality level where firms request for examination is larger than the  ex-ante expected 
quality level (?2 > 𝜇), firms can not gain a positive expected profit from the application; if 
?2 > ?1, the rate of examination request in period 2 is always 0; and if  ?1 < 𝜇, large part 
of applications are requested for examination in the early stage, though in point of fact 
the rate of examination request in early period is quite low in Japan (Yamauchi and Na-
gaoka, 2007). 
 
  ?1 =   ?(?  )??  
∞
?1 = 1 − ?(?1)                (11) 
  ?2 =   ?(?  )??  
?1
?2 = ?(?1) − ?(?2)              (12) 
  ? =   ?(?  )??  
∞
?2 = 1 − ?(?2) = ?1 + ?2              (13) 
 
 
Figure 1. Rate of examination request in each period 
 
   
                                                   
9  𝑃?[𝑋2 = 1] ∈ [0,1]  means that ?  is limited within a range of [−???2(? − ??)(2− ?) + ?,  ???2(? − ??)(2−
?) + ?], where ? = ?2(? − ??)(2− ?){(1− ?)𝜇 + ??  ?. 
?1 
?  ?  ?2  ?1 
?2   8 
 
First, we show the effect of the shortening period of examination request. This is 






2(1 − ?)(𝜇 − ?2)
?(2 − ?)










?2(? − ??)2?2?(?1 − 𝜇) − ?(??? − ?)
{?(2 − ?) − 2?(? − ??)?}?2(? − ??)?2  .                                                      (16) 
 
where  ?? = 𝜕? 𝜕?   = 2?2(? − ??)(1 − ?)(?1 − 𝜇)  and  (??? − ?) = −[?2(? − ??){?(?1 −
𝜇) + (1 − m)2𝜇} − ?]. Note that the sign of  𝜕?1 𝜕?     becomes negative if  ?  is sufficiently 
large, though it is generally unclear11. We can summarize the effect of shortening period 
of examination request (decreasing in  ?) as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 
If the period of request for examination is shortened,   
(a) even the relatively low-quality applications come to be requested for examination, and 
the rate of eventual examination request always rises; 
(b) the rate of examination request in early period declines and the firms’ decision of re-
quest tend to be postponed, when the examination request fee is sufficiently large.   
 
Shortening the examination request period makes it difficult for firms to screen out the 
low-quality applications. This increases the rate of eventual examination request. More-
over, firms attempt to avert the decrease in the amount of information by delaying their 
decision so as to request only valuable applications worth the fee. In other words, if the 
allowable period is shortened, even the low-quality applications are eventually requested 
for examination, whereas the early requests for examination are limited to high-quality 
applications. 
We now turn to analyze the effect of increase in the examination request fee, ex-






?2(? − ??)?(2 − ?)




?1? − 2?2(? − ??)
{?(2 − ?) − 2?(? − ??)?}?2(? − ??)?
  .                                                        (18) 
 
We can find  𝜕?1 𝜕?     is always positive if  ?  is sufficiently large, though it is generally 
unclear. In this case, both the rate of eventual request and early request for examination 
become lower as the examination request fee rises. However, we do not know whether the 
                                                   
10  We eliminate, for simplification, the situation that the discount factors in each period (?1  and ?2) change 
depending on the shortening of the allowable period. 
11  Under the condition  𝑃?[𝑋2 = 1] ∈ [0,1], the maximum level of  ?  is ?２(? − ??)(2− ?){(1− ?)𝜇 + ??   +
??}. In the case that  ?  is maximum level,  ?  is always negative. Therefore, the critical level of  ?  exists 
under which  ?  becomes negative.   9 
rate of examination request in the latter period increases. 
 
Proposition 2 
If the examination request fee is raised, 
(a) firms’ screening criteria becomes severe and the rate of eventual examination request 
declines; 
(b) only high-quality applications are requested for examination in early period, when the 
examination request fee is sufficiently large. 
 
The increase in the request fee for examination gives the firm incentive to select out the 
valuable applications deserving the cost. This increases the threshold to request for ex-
amination. As a result, the rate of examination request falls in both the first and second 
periods. 





?2?{𝜇 + ?(2 − ?)(?2 − 𝜇)}
?2(? − ??)?(2 − ?)




?{(? − 1)?2 + 2??}
2{?(2 − ?) − 2?(? − ??)?}?2(? − ??)2?
  .                                                   (20) 
 
In most cases the sign of  𝜕?1 𝜕?     becomes positive. Especially, if  ?  is sufficiently large 
and  ?  is sufficiently small,  𝜕?1 𝜕?   > 0  always holds12. In this case, the decrease in an-
nual fee raises the both rates of eventual and early request for examination. However, 
whether the rate in later period increases is unclear. 
 
Proposition 3 
If the annual fee decreases,  
(a) the expected profit of patenting becomes large and this leads to the rise in the rate of 
eventual examination request; 
(b) the rate of examination request in early period  increases, when the examination re-
quest fee is sufficiently large and the accuracy of the signal is not so low. 
 
Under the circumstances that examination request fee is high and the firms can precisely 
screen out the low-quality applications in early stage, the reduction in annual fee makes 
the early patenting more advantageous since it prolongs the period of patent protection 
with high success rates. 
Finally, we show the effect of the increase in the average quality of applications  (𝜇) 











2?(? − ??)? − ?(1 − ?)
{?(2 − ?) − 2?(? − ??)?}?
  .                                                                            (22) 
 
                                                   
12  If ?  is sufficiently large, A  is negative. Therefore, in this case, the denominator of equation (20) is also 
negative. Moreover, if ?  is sufficiently small, the numerator of (20) is likely negative. Especially, in case of 
1 ≤ ?, it is always negative.   10 
We can find  𝜕?1 𝜕𝜇   < 0  always holds if  ?  is sufficiently large. The rise in the average 
quality of applications enables firms to request for examination of low-quality applica-
tions which could not have been requested, by raising the firms’ expected profit. That is, 
the rate of eventual examination request rises as the number of claims becomes large. 
The distribution of the real quality of applications is skewed to the right with the rise in 
𝜇. This raises the rate of early request for examination, coupled with the decline in the 
firms’ critical level of early examination requests. These results are rewritten as follows, 
from the standpoint of the introduction of multiple-claim system. 
 
Proposition 4 
If multiple-claim system is introduced and the average number of claims increases, 
(a) the rate of eventual request for examination rises because of the increase in the av-
erage quality of applications; 
(b) the rate of early request for examination request becomes high when the examination 
request fee is sufficiently large. 
 
When the average quality of applications increases, the necessity for firms to spend lots of 
time to assess the quality of applications becomes low. This  accelerates the firms’ ex-
amination request behaviors. The expected signs of each variable derived from the model 
above are summarized in table 113. 
 
2.5 Further discussion 
We briefly discuss the impact of reforms on the social welfare. Some papers examine the 
socially optimal patent system, though few papers directly treat the examination request 
system14. Cornelli and Schankerman(1999) and Scotchmer(1999) analyze the social op-
timum combination of patent length and renewal fee15. In their model, the  firms’ incen-
tive to develop a high-quality inventions and the market competitiveness improve the 
social welfare whereas the monopoly power exacerbate the welfare. This tradeoff deter-
mines the socially optimal level of patent length and renewal fee. Our model focuses on   
 
 
Table 1. The signs of each variable 
  Rate of eventual 
examination request 
Rate of early   
examination request 
?  ∶  Period of examination request  －  ＋ 
?   ∶  Examination request fee  －  － 
?   ∶  Annual fee  －  － 
𝜇   ∶  Average number of claims  ＋  ＋ 
                                                   
13  We restrict our concern to the case that  ?  is sufficiently large and  ?  is sufficiently small.   
14  There are a lot of other papers which examines the influences of patent breadth and patent length on firms’ 
innovative activities or social welfare, such as Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett 
(1996) and O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998). 
15  Cornelli and Schankerman insist that policy maker can maximize the social welfare by setting the re-
newal fee to make the firm choose the optimal patent length. Under this mechanism, the renewal fee can 
differ from firm to firm. Scotchmer suggests that firms reveal honestly their willingness to pay for the re-
newal fee deserving the cost under the effective renewal fee (or subsidy) structure when the value and the 
cost of innovation have a positive correlation. As a result, the social optimal patent length can be identical 
among firms.   11 
the firm’s behavior after the application. That is, our model ignores the firms’ application 
behavior. Given the number of applications constant, firms’ expected profit is larger as 
the period of examination request is longer. This is because the option value of holding 
the right of examination request is large when the allowable period is long. Moreover, 
long allowable period gives firms to assess the qualities of their applications so that firms 
save their examination request cost and annual fee. As for the consumer surplus, it is 
improved when the rate of examination request is low as long as the amount of published 
applications keeps  constant. That  is, the dead weight  loss caused by firms’ monopoly 
power becomes small as the number of patent decreases. Thus, the shorter period of ex-
amination request always worsens the social welfare in our theoretical framework. 
In the actual modifications of fee structure in Japan, the JPO increases the exami-
nation request fee and decreases the annual patent fee. However, the expected total fee, 
which is the sum of the both expected fees, is kept almost constant as described later. We 
also  find  that  this  change  increases  the  expected  total  cost  of  firms  which  have 
low-quality applications whereas it decreases for firms having high-quality applications. 
Therefore, these amendments have an effect of raising the average quality of the appli-
cations which are requested for examination with the expected profit of firms on average 
held constant. This improves the social welfare. In summary, we can see that these series 
of system reforms have an effect of balancing the both positive and negative impacts on 
social welfare. 
However, if firms’ application or R&D behavior and the information asymmetry are 
considered, the longer period of examination request can deteriorate social welfare. One 
reason is that leaving the applications unexamined restrains other firms’ R&D and ap-
plication behavior. This reduces the public knowledge which anyone can access. Moreover, 
when the quality of inventions is private information, the social welfare can decrease as a 
result of firms’ opportunistic behaviors. In this case, firms have an incentive to file ap-
plications in order to block the R&D activities of other firms even if they know that the 
quality of their invention is quite low. Based on this perspective, longer period of exami-
nation request is not always desirable for social welfare16. We can, therefore, expect to 
exist the optimal allowable period. Similarly, the optimal level of examination request fee 
and annual fee would exist which decreases the  requests for examination of relatively 
low-quality applications with ensuring the firms’ incentive to invest in R&D. Thus the 
optimal revision of fee structures can alleviate the decrease in the average quality of ap-
plications which are examination requested by the shortening the allowable period. In 
this point of view, we can say that these system reforms are complementary policy means 
to improve the social welfare. 
 
 
3.    The Data 
 
3.1 Data collection 
We use the two data sources, patent data and business and financial account data, to 
analyze the impact of system reforms discussed above. Our patent data is obtained from 
IIP Patent Database (β  version), we call as IIP-DB hereafter, which is provided by In-
stitute  of  Intellectual  Property.  The  account  data  is  from  NEEDS  by  Nihon  Keizai 
Shimbun, Inc. IIP-DB was developed based on the patents filed with the Japan Patent 
Office, and consists of patent application file, registration file, applicant file, right holder 
                                                   
16  If the applications obviously do not have patentability, it can be effective measures for third parties to 
request for examination for the concerned applications.     12 
file, citation information file and inventor file. The last publication date of application 
included in this database is May 2007. All patent applications, in principle, are published 
in the public domain after 18 months from the filing date in Japan. We can, therefore, use 
the application data which filed by December 200517. 
We restrict our analysis to the firms that have been publicly traded for the 1986-2005 
periods and have been disclosed their R&D expenses during this whole period (827 firms). 
The patent data are matched to these firms, using firms’ (applicants’) harmonized names 
and addresses. As a result of this match, the final number of our sample becomes 726. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the shortening of the period of 
examination request and the reforms of fee schedule. Our estimations are based on firm 
level and firm-IPC level monthly data. In the analysis of the impact of shortening of the 
allowable period, we use the rate of “eventual” request for examination. This rate is cal-
culated as a ratio of the corresponding cumulative number of examination requests of a 
firm (or a firm-IPC) over the allowable period to the number of applications filed during 
certain one month. That is, this rate shows how many of the applications which were filed 
during certain one month are finally requested for examination. 
By the end of September 2001, the examination request period is 7 years in Japan. 
Therefore, we cannot use the patent data which are filed between January 1999 and 
September 2001 since the examination request duration does not expire. After October 
2001, the period of examination request is shortened to 3 years. This enables us to use the 
examination request data applied by the December 2002 because the last date of appli-
cation is December 2005 in IIP-DB. 
The Japan Patent Office raises the examination request fee and decreases the annual 
fee in April 2004. In the analysis of this impact the rate of eventual examination request 
cannot be calculated because of the data truncation. For this reason, we use the rate of 
“early” request for examination. This rate is calculated by dividing the number of ex-
amination requests which are done within one year from the date of applications by the 
number of applications. This enables us to use the patent data filed by December 2004. 
 
3.2 Brief overview 
We start with some descriptive information about our dataset. Figure 2 illustrates the 
average rate of eventual request for examination and the total number of applications of 
samples. We draw this figure based on patent level yearly data, though our estimations 
are based on firm level and firm-IPC level monthly data. Since examination request du-
ration does not end for the applications filed between 1999 and 2001, and after 2003, we 
exclude these periods in this figure. Note that the number of applications and examina-
tion requests are fractionally counted by the number of applicants in this paper.   
The rate of eventual examination request shows the gradual increase from 1988 and 
sharp rise from 1998 to 2002, whereas the number of applications shows a monotonous 
downward trend from 1990. We can consider this change as a result of the introduction of 
multiple-claim system in 1988 (the average number of claims increases from 2.2 in 1988 
to 5.2 in 1998) and the shortening period of examination request in 2001. 
Next, we see the changes in the average rate of early request for examination based 
on firm level monthly data in Figure 3. This rate is obtained by using the examination 
request within one year from the application date. 
We add the average expected total fee of a firm per examination request, which is the 
sum of the average expected examination fee and average annual fee, in Figure 3. Note 
                                                   
17  The detailed explanation of IIP-DB is given in Goto and Motohashi (2007).   13 
 




that the expected annual fee is the total amount of expected fee which firms have to pay   
to keep their patent in force during the expected renewal periods. Therefore, in calcula-
tion of this fee, we use an average grant rate which is the ratio of the number of patent 
registrations to the number of examination requests and an average patent renewal pe-
riod of each firm between 1980 and 198418.   
    The main goal of the reforms of fee schedule is to reduce the total fee for relatively 
high-quality patents and to raise it for the relatively low-quality patents. This enhances 
the average quality of applications which are requested for examination with the average 
total fee held constant. To see this effect, we classify the sample into two groups by the 
average grant rate a nd the average renewal  period. We  define “low-quality group” as 
firms of which the grant rate is lower and the renewal periods are shorter than average. 
Similarly, “high-quality group” is the firms whose grant rate is higher and the renewal 
period is longer than average. We plot the expected total fee for each group in Figure 3. 
As expected, we can see in this figure, the expected total fee of high-quality group 
decreases and that of low-quality increases after April 2004, holding the average total fee 
nearly constant. The rate of early examination request shows upward trend after the fee 
reforms in April 2004, though the average total fee remains almost unchanged. This gives 
some indication of the possibility that the effect of the decrease in annual fee is larger 
than that of the increase in the examination request fee. If the revision of fee schedule 
enhances the average quality, the rate of examination request would decrease. We, how-
ever, cannot confirm this effect in the figure. Using the quantitative method, we evaluate 
this impact more precisely in the next subsection. 
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3.2 Estimation framework 
Fist, we estimate the following equation to analyze the effect of shortening the period of 
request for examination.   
 
  ???????,?,? = ?0 + ?1 ??????,? + ?2 ????????,? + ?3 ???,?,? + ?4 ????????,? 
            +?5 ????????,?,? + ?6 ??????????? + ?7 ?ℎ?????? + ?8 ????????,?,?   
                    +?9 (?ℎ?????? × ????????,?,?)+ ωi ?10 + ?? ?11 + 𝜑?,? ?12 + 𝜃?,? + ??,?,?  .  (23) 
 
In this specification,  ?  denotes the firm,  ?  denotes the main IPC class of applications 
each firm files and  ?  denotes the monthly time. For our estimation based on the firm 
level data, we can ignore the subscript  ?  in the equation (23). Variable  𝜃?,?  is a firm-IPC 
fixed effect. We introduce industry dummy  ωi  and year dummy (not monthly)  ??. More-
over, we include industry-year dummy  𝜑?,?, which is  ω?  times  ??, to control for unob-
served common shocks and the appropriability in each industry and each year. The va-
riable  ??,?,?  is an error term. Note that we eliminate the data of which the period of ex-
amination request is unexpired in this estimation. It is between January 1999 and Sep-
tember 2001 during which the maximum delay a firm has for examination request was 7 
years, and after January 2003. 
The dependent variable  ???????,?,?  is the rate of eventual request for examination of 
the applications which firm  ?  filed in IPC  ?  at time  ?. 
The independent variable  ?????  is the R&D intensity, which is the rate of R&D ex-
penditure to the amount of tangible asset. We control firm size by logarithm of tangible 
asset (???????). We include the number of applications of each firm-IPC (??), and the total 


































rate of early request for examination
Fig. 3 Expected total fee and the average rate of early examination request   15 
ested in are from  ?5  to  ?9  in equation (23). The variable  ???????  is the average number 
of claims. We expect that the increase in  ???????  raise the examination request rate 
since the number of claims reflects the quality of the application. In addition, we examine 
the effect of the introduction of multiple-claim system by the dummy variable  ??????????, 
which takes 1 after January 1988. The dummy variable  ?ℎ?????, which takes 1 after 
October 2001, is created to capture the impact of shortening of the period of examination 
request. The variable  ???????  reflects the firm’s uncertainty. It is calculated as the ratio 
of the number of examination requests in the latter half of allowable period to the number 
of those over the whole allowable period. We can consider  ???????  as the index of firms’ 
propensity for delaying their decision-making. It is expected that the impact of shorten-
ing period of examination request is larger for the firms (or IPC classes) with high un-
certainty. This is because the firms with high certainty already face a difficulty of as-
sessing the availability of their applications within the allowable period. We capture this 
relation by including the cross term of  ?ℎ?????  and  ???????, (?ℎ????? × ???????). The ex-
planations of all variables used in the estimation are summarized in table A-2 in Appen-
dix. 
Second, we postulate the following specification to examine the effect of changes in 
the fee structure along with the shortening of allowable period. 
 
  ??????????,?,? = ?0 + ?1 ??????,? + ?2 ????????,? + ?3 ???,?,? + ?4 ????????,? 
           +?5 ????????,?,? + ?6 ???????????,?,? + ?7 (𝐿??,? × ???????????,?,?)   
                    +?8 ?ℎ?????? + ωi ?9 + ?? ?10 + 𝜑?,? ?11 + 𝜃?,? + ??,?,?  .    (24) 
 
The dependent variable  ??????????,?,?  is the rate of early request for examination which 
is calculated by using the examination request within one year from the application date. 
The merit of limiting the examination request data within one year is that we can extend 
the sample period to December 200419. That is, we can use 8 periods after the reforms of 
fee structure in April 2004. Furthermore, we can examine whether the timing of exami-
nation request is accelerated since  ??????????,?,?  reflects how large part of applications 
are requested in the early stage of allowable period. 
The independent variable  ??????????  is the logarithm of expected total fee per ex-
amination request. This variable is calculated by using the average grant rate and aver-
age renewal length between 1980 and 198420. We expect that the impact of the changes in 
fee schedule is larger for the firms having relatively low-quality applications. This is be-
cause the distribution of the patent quality is skewed to the left, and  the policy reform 
increases  the  expected  total  fee  for  the  low -quality  patents  whereas  the  one  for 
high-quality patents decreases. In other words, the elasticity of examination request for 
the expected total fee is larger for the firms having low-quality applications. We confirm 
this  effect  with  the  cross  term  of  the  dummy  variable   𝐿??,?   and  the  variable 
???????????,?,?. The variable 𝐿??,?  takes 1 if the grant rate is lower than and the renewal 
periods are shorter than the average, which we define as “low-quality group” in Figure 3. 
It is expected that both  ?6  and  ?7  in equation (24) becomes negative. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimation are provided in Table 
A-3 (in Appendix). 
 
                                                   
19  Another merit is that we need not to eliminate the data between January 1999 and September 2001 and 
after January 2003 (till December 2004). 
20  Our sample is reduced to 659 firms since 67 firms have missing values in the period from 1980 to 1984.   16 
3.3 Estimation results 
Table 2 and Table 3 report the results of the OLS estimation of equation (23) based on 
firm level data and firm-IPC level data, respectively. We employ fixed effect estimation in 
model (1) and (2), and pooled estimation in model (3) and (4). The control variables  ?????, 
???????  and  ??  have negative effect in almost all cases on the rate of examination re-
quest.    Thus,  R&D intensity  increases the number of applications more than that  of 
examination requests and larger size of firms and applications result in the lower rate of 
examination request. 
The impact of the introduction of multiple-claim system (??????????) has significantly 
negative effect in Table 2. This effect becomes insignificant in Table3, controlling the dif-
ferences  in  IPC  with  the  estimation  based  on  firm-IPC  level  data.  The  variable 
??????????  may reflect the first reaction of firms to the introduction of multiple-claim 
system, since the coefficient of dummy variable is evaluated at a specific point in time. On 
the other hand, the variable  ???????  has a significant positive effect on the rate of ex-
amination request. Therefore, we find that the introduction of multiple-claim system does 
not have immediate effect, whereas it raises the examination request rate in the long run 
with the gradual increase in the average number of claims. That is, the long-term in-
crease in the average quality of applications with the multiple claim system raises the 
rate  of examination request  over long periods. This is  consistent with the theoretical 
proposition 4 (a) shown in previous section. 
 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
rdint -0.122*** -0.154*** -0.132*** -0.211***
(4.80) (7.96) (10.39) (20.96)
lnasset -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.036*** -0.072***
(8.22) (14.92) (36.96) (93.49)
ap -0.331*** -0.355*** -0.187*** -0.058***
(16.08) (23.86) (15.29) (6.23)
avclaim 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(9.06) (10.88) (12.76) (19.06)
multiclaim -0.068*** -0.048** -0.051* -0.067***
(2.67) (2.45) (1.85) (3.03)
shorten 0.157*** 0.094*** 0.139*** 0.062***





year*industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.108*** 1.339*** 1.099*** 1.630***
(24.33) (38.54) (50.32) (92.33)
Observations 81801 75850 81801 75850
Number of firms 726 725
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.23
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
exrate
fixed effect pooled  17 




We are interested in the effect of the shortening of the period of examination request. 
The coefficient of the variable  ?ℎ?????  shows the immediate impact of shortening period. 
It is significantly positive in model (1) and (3) in the both firm level and firm-IPC level 
estimation. Therefore, the shortening the allowable period raises the rate of eventual 
request for examination, as expected. This result supports the theoretical proposition 1 
(a). We expect that the shortening of the period makes the firms with high certainty re-
quest for more examinations. In model (2) and (4), we include the cross term  ?ℎ????? ×
???????  to examine this effect. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant in 
both firm level and firm-IPC level estimation. Thus, we find that the positive impact of 
shortening of the period on the examination request rate is large especially for the firm 
(-IPC) facing high uncertainty. 
Next, we show the results of OLS estimation of equation (24) in Table 4 and 5. Note 
that in this estimation, the dependent variable is the rate of early request for examina-
tion which firms requests within one year from the application date. This enables us to 
analyze the impact of changes in the fee structure on firms’ early stage request behaviors. 
The models (1) and (2) show the results of fixed effect estimation, and models (3) and (4) 
show the results of pooled estimation. In this estimation, R&D intensity has a positive 
effect on the early request for examination. We can consider the applications which firms 
request examination in early stage as relatively high-quality applications. Thus, this re-
sult may capture the fact that the quality of applications of firms with high R&D inten-
(1) (2) (3) (4)
rdint 0.027* 0.004 -0.082*** -0.103***
(1.68) (0.36) (14.51) (26.34)
lnasset -0.076*** -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.057***
(22.26) (23.37) (98.67) (169.75)
ap -1.866*** -3.083*** -0.187*** -2.253***
(26.11) (73.71) (4.75) (91.72)
avclaim 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.005***
(41.89) (28.03) (47.74) (40.41)
multiclaim -0.015 -0.020 -0.081*** 0.007
(0.62) (1.30) (3.32) (0.39)
shorten 0.046* 0.046* 0.100*** -0.014





lnipcap -0.009*** -0.056*** -0.006*** -0.034***
(3.78) (34.78) (12.69) (97.20)
year*industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.482*** 1.732*** 1.266*** 1.754***
(37.16) (65.20) (66.81) (136.65)
Observations 502689 373754 502708 373766
Number of firm-IPCs 25078 21548
R-squared 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.23
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
exrate
fixed effect pooled  18 
sity is high. The coefficients of other control variables,  ???????  and  ??, have the same 
sign as the results of estimation of equation (23) though the significances are lower.   
In Models (2) and (4), we include  ??????????  and  ?ℎ?????  to analyze the impact of 
multiple-claim system and the shortening of the period on firms’ behavior of early stage 
examination requests.  We confirm  that the introduction of multiple-claim  system has 
little effect, though the long-term increase in the average number of claims (???????) has 
strongly significant effect. This is consistent with proposition 4 (b). The variable  ?ℎ????? 
has positive coefficient. According to the theoretical proposition 1 (b), shortening the al-
lowable period gives the firm an incentive to delay their decision in order to respond to 
the decrease in the amount of information. The empirical result does not support this 
proposition.  We  can  attribute  this  seemingly  inconsistent  result  to  the  fact  that  the 
theoretical model assumes that the same amount of additional information exists for the 
first and second period. In fact, the information available for the second period is much 
smaller after the reform, since the length of the second period is only 2 years, compared to 
6 years before the reform. It is, therefore, more profitable for them to request for exami-
nation in early stage, since the additional information available is limited. The coefficient 
of the variable  ??????????  is significantly negative in all estimations. Thus, we find the 
decrease in the annual fee raises the rate of examination request in early stage. At the 
same time, the increase in the examination request fee decreases the examination re-
quest rate. This result can support the theoretical proposition 2 and 3. Our additional 
interest in this estimation is whether the impact of fee reform varies depending on the 
quality of applications. The impact of the increase in the examination request fee is near- 
 
 
Table 4. Impact of fee structure reforms (firm level) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
rdint 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.015** 0.015**
(4.53) (4.52) (2.14) (2.12)
lnasset -0.004 -0.004 -0.020*** -0.020***
(1.63) (1.64) (34.32) (34.32)
ap -0.155*** -0.155*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(12.54) (12.51) (7.30) (7.32)
avclaim 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***





lntotalfee -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(3.28) (3.29) (8.33) (8.32)
LD*lntotalfee -0.018 -0.017 -0.001*** -0.001***
(1.54) (1.53) (7.68) (7.68)
year*industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.255*** 1.257*** 0.584*** 0.584***
(4.02) (4.02) (14.75) (14.75)
Observations 106909 106909 106909 106909
Number of firms 659 659
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
oneexrate
fixed effect pooled  19 




ly identical to all firms, whereas that of the decrease in the annual fee is larger for the 
firms with high-quality inventions. As a result, the reforms of fee schedule can be consi-
dered to increase the average quality of applications which are requested for examination. 
We examine this effect by introducing the cross term,  𝐿? × ??????????  in our estimation. 
The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is negative. As expected, the estima-
tion results show the negative coefficient of  𝐿? × ??????????, though the signi- ficance in 
the fixed effect estimation based on the firm level data is low. 
The empirical results reported in this section are summarized as follows. The short-
ening of the period of examination request increases the rate of both eventual and early 
request for examination. This decreases the average quality of the applications for which 
examinations are requested. On the other hand, the revision of fee structure increases the 
rate of early examination request of firms with high-quality applications whereas it de-
creases that of firms with low-quality inventions. This increases the average quality of 
the applications which are requested for examination. 
In this light, we can say that these policy reforms of Japanese examination request 




In  recent  years,  the  number  of  requests  for  examination  has  substantially  increased 
whereas the number of applications has shown little increase in Japan. The Japan Patent 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
rdint 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.113*** 0.113***
(17.86) (17.86) (51.38) (51.38)
lnasset -0.009***-0.009*** -0.010***-0.010***
(7.02) (7.02) (49.87) (49.86)
ap -0.731***-0.731*** 0.027 0.027
(24.13) (24.11) (1.51) (1.53)
avclaim 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***






(6.49) (6.52) (26.10) (26.11)
LD*lntotalfee -0.037***-0.037*** -0.003***-0.003***
(10.49) (10.49) (47.17) (47.19)
lnipcap -0.006***-0.006*** -0.003***-0.003***
(6.20) (5.87) (13.01) (12.95)
year*industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.865*** 0.865*** 0.693*** 0.693***
(10.44) (10.44) (32.59) (32.60)
Observations 662775 662775 662797 662797
Number of firm-IPCs 26747 26747
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
oneexrate
fixed effect pooled  20 
Office shortened the examination request period in order to decrease the stock of unex-
amined  applications  which  have  uncertain  exclusive  rights.  Furthermore,  the  JPO 
amended the examination request fee and the annual fee to decrease the examination 
requests of low-quality applications. We theoretically and empirically evaluate the impact 
of these policy reforms. 
The  econometric  estimation  provides  the  evidence  that  the  one  of  the  causes  of 
long-term  increase  in  the  rate  of  examination  request  is  the  gradual  increase  in  the 
number of claims by the introduction of multiple-claim system. Our estimation also sug-
gests that the shortening of the period of examination request gives firms an incentive to 
request for examinations of relatively low-quality applications. The impact of this reform 
is especially large for the firms with high uncertainty. Furthermore, the increase in the 
expected total fee decreases the rate of examination request. This has a larger impact on 
the firms which have relatively low-quality applications. 
The shortening of the period of examination request is expected to restrain firms to 
leave the stock of applications with uncertain patentability. This can hinder rival firms’ 
innovative activities.  Theoretical analysis shows  that  shortening the allowable period 
increases the examination requests of relatively low-quality inventions and raises the 
examination request rate. This causes the decrease in the average quality of applications 
which are examination requested and increase the eventual grants of the patents, while 
reducing the expected profit from the patenting of the patentees. On the other hand, the 
increase in the examination request fee and the decrease in the annual fee have an effect 
to enhance the average quality of examination requested-applications. This revision off-
sets the impact of the shortening of the period by which the quality of patents decrease 
and the examination request rate rises. Based on this perspective, we can say that these 

























On or before March 31, 2004 ¥84,300 + ( ¥2,000 × number of claims )
On or after April 1, 2004 ¥168,600 + ( ¥4,000 × number of claims )
Annual fee
On or before March 31, 2004 ¥13,000 + ( ¥1,100 × number of claims ) 1st to 3rd year
¥20,300 + ( ¥1,600 × number of claims ) 4th to 6th year
¥40,600 + ( ¥3,200 × number of claims ) 7th to 9th year
¥81,200 + ( ¥6,400 × number of claims ) 10th year or above
On or after April 1, 2004 ¥2,600 + ( ¥200 × number of claims ) 1st to 3rd year
¥8,100 + ( ¥600 × number of claims ) 4th to 6th year
¥24,300 + ( ¥1,900 × number of claims ) 7th to 9th year
¥81,200 + ( ¥6,400 × number of claims ) 10th year or above
variable explanation
exrate rate of eventual request for examination
oneexrate ratio of the number of examination requests within one year
from the application date to the number of applications
rdint rate of R&D expenses to tangible asset
lnasset logarithm of tangible asset
ap number of applications
avclaim average number of claims
multiclaim dummy variable which takes 1 after the introducion of
multiple-claim system (in Jan. 1988)
shorten dummy variable which takes 1 after the shortening period of
request for examination (in Oct. 2001)
rlatter rate of the number of examination requests in the latter half
of allowable period to those over the whole allowable period
shortrlatter cross term of shorten and rlatter
lntotalfee logarithm of the sum of examination request fee and annual
fee lnipcap logarithm of total number of applications in relevant IPC
class LD dummy variable which takes 1 if the grant rate is lower
than and renewal period is shorter than average.  22 









Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
exrate 81837 0.684 0.316 0 1
rdint 81837 0.090 0.115 0.000 1.037
lnasset 81837 10.094 1.496 3.466 16.297
ap 81837 28.128 108.309 0.001 2673.928
avclaim 81801 3.451 2.743 1 82
multiclaim 81837 0.872 0.334 0 1
shorten 81837 0.093 0.291 0 1
rlatter 75878 0.687 0.384 0 1
shorten*rlatter 75878 0.081 0.262 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
exrate 503063 0.585 0.421 0 1
rdint 503027 0.126 0.137 0.000 1.037
lnasset 503027 11.283 1.567 3.466 16.297
ap 503063 4.576 15.624 0.001 776.667
avclaim 502735 3.534 3.454 1 186
multiclaim 503063 0.877 0.329 0 1
shorten 503063 0.089 0.285 0 1
rlatter 374055 0.725 0.412 0 1
shorten*rlatter 374055 0.085 0.274 0 1
lnipcap 503063 5.735 1.230 0.223 8.455
Analysis of shortening of the period (firm-IPC level)
Analysis of shortening of the period (firm level)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oneexrate 110583 0.081 0.221 0 1
rdint 110583 0.093 0.124 0.000 2.739
lnasset 110583 10.115 1.486 3.466 16.297
ap 110583 26.855 101.625 0.001 2673.928
avclaim 110028 4.114 3.162 1 82
multiclaim 110583 0.905 0.293 0 1
shorten 110583 0.176 0.381 0 1
lntotalfee 106909 13.444 0.344 11.721 15.429
LD 107468 0.228 0.420 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oneexrate 673186 0.057 0.210 0 1
rdint 673136 0.130 0.151 0 2.739
lnasset 673136 11.272 1.550 3.466 16.297
ap 673186 4.411 14.792 0.001 776.667
avclaim 667873 4.250 4.027 1 186
multiclaim 673186 0.908 0.289 0 1
shorten 673186 0.164 0.370 0 1
lntotalfee 662797 13.414 0.301 11.721 15.991
LD 668104 0.266 0.442 0 1
lnipcap 673186 5.758 1.240 0.134 8.455
Analysis of changes in fee structures (firm level)
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